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We must use what has been called ‘smart power’: the full range of tools at 
our disposal – diplomatic, economic, military, political, legal, and cultural 
– picking the right tool, or combination of tools, for each situation. 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, 20091 
 
Introduction 
Today’s strategic environment is increasingly characterized by threats that ‚are 
both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherently unpredictable, and where our 
capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by political, 
diplomatic, informational and economic constraints. In short, it is an environment 
marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).‛2 Decision-
makers, both civilian and military, who want to operate effectively in this environment 
                                                          
1 Quoted in Derek S. Reveron and James L. Cook, ‚Developing Strategists: Translating National Strategy 
into Theater Strategy,‛ Joint Forces Quarterly, Vol. 55 (4), p. 22. 
2 Stephen A. Shambach, Strategic Leadership Primer, 2nd ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 
2004, p. 1. 
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must consider a wide range of social, political and cultural factors and demonstrate 
cognitive flexibility, adaptability and the ability to make decisions ‚on the fly.‛  
Decision-making under conditions of risk and uncertainty necessitates strategic 
leadership competencies that can help to make sense of the fluid strategic environment. 
As the U.S. Army’s stability operations field manual states, ‚military success alone will 
not be sufficient to prevail in this environment.‛3 Instead of the hierarchically focused, 
linear strategic thinking that has dominated traditional military decision-making, the 
turbulent VUCA environment requires non-linear cognitive competencies characterized 
by the ‚ability to recognize changes in the environment; to determine what is new<and 
what must be learned to be effective.‛4 In this environment, effective strategic leaders 
must recognize which decision factors are most important in relation to the big picture, 
must be able to identify and prioritize alternatives, integrate information from a variety 
of sources, and detect trends, associations and cause-effect relationships. 
While the U.S. military excels in preparing its soldiers and officers for the 
operational demands and tactical requirements of a wide array of increasingly complex 
contingency missions, a number of observers have pointed to the need for teaching 
strategy more effectively as part of professional military education (PME).5 Former 
Commandant of the U.S. Army War College, Maj. Gen. Robert H. Scales argued:  
Today’s conflicts demand officers who can lead indirectly and perform in 
an uncertain, ambiguous, complex, chaotic and inherently unpredictable 
environment. Our educational system needs to produce more men and 
women who can anticipate conditions that do not yet exist. They must be 
capable of dealing with unfamiliar cultures and an enemy who is 
unconstrained by Western values and methods of warfare.6  
                                                          
3 Headquarters, Department of the Army, ‚Stability Operations,‛ Field Manual No. 3-07, foreword, 
Washington, DC, 6 October 2008, at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-07.pdf, accessed 05/19/11. 
4 William Steele and Robert Walters, ‚21st Century Leadership Competencies: Three Yards in a Cloud of 
Dust or the Forward Pass?‛ Army Magazine, August 2001, p. 31, quoted in Wong et al., ‚Strategic 
Leadership Competencies,‛ p. 6. 
5 See for instance Gabriel Marcella and Stephen O. Fought, ‚Teaching Strategy in the 21st Century,‛ Joint 
Forces Quarterly, Issue 52 (1), 2009, pp. 56-60. 
6 Robert Scales, ‚Return of the Jedi,‛ Armed Forces Journal, October 2009, pp. 22. 
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How can the U.S. military develop strategic thinkers who can operate effectively in the 
complex and uncertain contemporary security environment? While certainly not the 
only educational tool, some experts have argued that the use of case studies may 
provide invaluable pedagogical benefits in preparing strategic decision-makers for 
complex decision-contexts.7 
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which the case study 
method can provide an effective vehicle for teaching strategy and strategic decision-
making to military professionals. Specifically, I examine some of the cognitive frames 
that inform strategic decision-making, discuss the importance of heuristic shortcuts as 
cognitive decision-guides, and compare the rational actor decision model that has 
traditionally informed linear strategic decision-making in the military with a sense-
making framework more suitable to complex strategic environments. Finally, I provide 
a brief introduction to the case study method and illustrate how case studies can be 
employed effectively to teach strategic thinking using the sense-making framework in 
civilian and military educational settings. 
 
Strategic Thinking 
Strategy, according to Harry Yarger’s recent Little Book on Big Strategy, ‚provides 
a coherent blueprint to bridge the gap between the realities of today and a desired 
future. It is the disciplined calculation of overarching objectives, concepts, and 
resources within acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable future outcomes 
than might otherwise exist if left to chance or the hands of others.‛8 Strategy emerges 
                                                          
7 See Ibid.; see also Volker Franke, ‚Making Sense of Chaos: Teaching Strategy Using Case Studies,‛ in 
Gabriel Marcella (ed.), Teaching Strategy: Challenge and Response, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 
U.S. Army War College, 2010, pp. 241-274; Jeanne M. Leidtka and John W. Rosenblum, ‚Teaching 
Strategy as Design: A Report from the Field,‛ in Journal of Management Education, Vol. 22, No.3, June 1998, 
pp. 285-303; Vicky Golich, Mark Boyer, Patrice Franko and Steve Lamy, ‚The ABCs of Case Teaching,‛ 
Pew Case Studies in International Affairs, Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, Edmund A. Walsh School 
of Foreign Affairs, Georgetown University, Washington, DC, 2000, available at 
http://www.usc.edu/programs/cet/private/pdfs/abcs.pdf, accessed 01/16/09. 
8 Harry R. Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: 
U.S. Army War College, February 2006, p. 5, at  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=641, accessed 05/22/11. 
 
 
JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES 
4 | P a g e  
 
over time as intentions are adjusted to accommodate changing realities. Strategy also 
provides rational direction for courses of action intended to maximize desired and 
minimize undesired outcomes in a given context. For the Department of Defense 
(DOD), strategy is ‚the art and science of developing and employing instruments of 
national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, 
and/or multinational objectives.‛9 More generally, Nickols defines strategy along four 
dimensions: perspective, position, plan and pattern. It is,  
the bridge between policy or high-order goals on the one hand and tactics 
or concrete actions on the other. Strategy and tactics together straddle the 
gap between ends and means. In short, strategy is a term that refers to a 
complex web of thoughts, ideas, insights, experiences, goals, expertise, 
memories, perceptions, and expectations that provides general guidance 
for specific actions in pursuit of particular ends. Strategy is at once the 
course we chart, the journey we imagine and, at the same time, it is the 
course we steer, the trip we actually make. Even when we are embarking 
on a voyage of discovery, with no particular destination in mind, the 
voyage has a purpose, an outcome, an end to be kept in view.10 
Strategy does not exist outside the ends being sought. It serves as a general 
framework providing guidance for actions to be taken and is itself in turn shaped by 
those actions. Thus, a clear understanding of the purpose and the ends pursued is a 
necessary precondition of any effective strategy. Strategy determines means and is 
about the attainment of ends, not their specification. If strategy has any meaning, it is 
only in relation to the achievement of these ends.  
In today’s complex security environment, military leaders need to develop and 
hone strategic talent, learn to conceive, invent, or discover theoretical ideas, and draft 
and implement well-reasoned plans of action. More than ever before, Gray argues, ‚all 
military activity has some net strategic weight that scores for the home team on the 
                                                          
9 Joint Publication (JP) 1-02, DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, p. 350, at 
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp1_02.pdf, accessed 05/20/11; see also Reveron and Cook, 
‚Developing Strategists.‛ 
10 Fred Nickols, ‚Strategy: Definitions and Meaning,‛ p. 5. at  
http://home.att.net/~nickols/strategy_definition.htm, accessed 01/14/09. 
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course of events. Every corporal is a strategic corporal.‛11 Consequently, strategic 
thinking in complex operational environments at all levels focuses on identifying 
potential opportunities and developing them in pursuit of a desired end. Generally, 
strategic objectives are derived from ‚national policy in pursuit of a predetermined 
national interest in consideration of issues, trends, risks, threats, challenges, and 
opportunities that affect those interests.‛12 
In the context of military operations, strategists are ‚charged either, or both, 
with: (1) guiding and shaping subordinate military operations by major units in 
campaigns for the purpose of securing military advantage (success or victory); and (2) 
guiding and shaping the course of military events for the purpose of achieving the 
polity’s political goals.‛13  
Conceived this way, strategy becomes part of a rational decision structure: First 
are the ends to be obtained. Second are the strategies for obtaining them, i.e., the ways 
in which resources will be allocated. Third are the tactics, i.e., the ways in which 
resources are actually used. Finally are the resources at our disposal for achieving the 
desired end(s).14 And effective strategy, Yarger conjectures, must be proactive. It is 
fundamentally a choice; it reflects a preference for a future state or 
condition in the strategic environment. It assumes that, while the future 
cannot be predicted, the strategic environment can be studied and 
assessed. Trends, issues, opportunities, and threats can be identified with 
analysis, and influenced and shaped through what the state chooses to do 
or not do. Thus strategy seeks to influence and shape the future 
environment as opposed simply to reacting to it.15  
                                                          
11 Colin S. Gray, ‚Schools for Strategy: Teaching Strategy for 21st Century Conflict,‛ Strategic Studies 
Institute, November 2009, p. 14, at  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubid=947, accessed 05/20/11. 
12 See J. Boone Bartholomees, Jr, (ed.), U.S. Army War College Guide to National Security Issues, Carlisle, PA: 
Strategic Studies Institute, 4th edition, 2010, at  
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=1004, accessed 05/20/2011. 
13 Gray, ‚Schools for Strategy.‛ 
14 Ibid., p. 7. 
15 Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century, p. 65. 
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The central challenge, Dorff conjectures is ‚adapting effectively to the new 
circumstances while simultaneously balancing against the lingering circumstances from 
the older system.‛16 
Traditional military strategic thinking has been characterized largely by a unique 
professional expertise (in the management of violence),17 hierarchical organizational 
decision arrangements, formal positions of authority, and imposed certainty through 
predetermined standard operating procedures. The sort of traditional planning 
underlying this conception aims at ‚reducing uncertainty and risk. It is highly 
methodical and based on the common belief that if organizations can somehow collect 
and analyze sufficient data, they can rationally find solutions on their way to a better 
future‛ (see Figure 1 below).18 However, the traditional professional expertise and rigid 
values that have informed strategic thinking in the military in the past may today be 
‚powerful inhibitors of innovation because of the vested interest they create in the 
status quo.‛19 In fact, Papparone et al. conclude: ‚In a turbulent environment, the 
hierarchically focused strategic leadership will suffice less and less because it cannot 
respond to changing circumstances in a timely manner.‛20 The need for strategic 
decision-making at every turn of an ever-more complex operational environment will 
require that strategic leadership capabilities, ranging from mental agility and cross-
cultural savvy to interpersonal maturity and professional astuteness, will be ingrained 
into the readily available skill set of military leaders and will become second-nature to 
their decision-making.21 In complex and uncertain environments, ‚detailed, 
comprehensive long-range plans, created by staff analysts and blessed by senior 
                                                          
16 Robert H. Dorff, ‚A Primer in Strategy Development,‛ in Joseph R. Cerami and James F. Holcomb, Jr. 
(eds.), U.S. Army War College Guide to Strategy, Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2001, p. 14, 
at http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=362, accessed 05/22/11. 
17 See for instance, Samuel Huntingon, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military 
Relations, Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1957.  
18 Larry E. Greiner and Thomas G. Cummings, Dynamic Strategy-Making: A Real-Time Approach for the 21st 
Century Leader, San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2009, p. 5. 
19 Christopher R. Papparone, Ruth A. Anderson and Reuben R. McDaniel, Jr., ‚Where Military 
Professionalism meets Complexity Science,‛ Armed Forces & Society, Vol. 34 (3), 2008, p. 445. 
20 Ibid., p. 434. 
21 For a detailed description of the strategic leaders kill sets for officers in the post 9/11-environment, see 
Leonard Wong, Stephen Gerras, William Kidd, Robert Pricone and Richard Swengros, ‚Strategic 
Leadership Competencies,‛ Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, September 2003, at 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/ldr_comps.pdf, accessed 05/22/11. 
 
               VOLUME 13, ISSUE 2, WINTER 2011                        
 
 
7 | P a g e  
 
management for dissemination to the ‘troops’ below, are no longer seen as key to 
success. Instead, the ability to think broadly and opportunistically at all levels in the 
organization, within the context of the larger corporate vision, is heralded as the key to 
competitive advantage.‛22 How can this kind of complex strategic thinking be 
inculcated? How can military professionals be trained to become effective strategic 
leaders in VUCA environments? A brief excursion into the cognitive processes that 




In an ideal world, theories of classic rationality tell us, we would make decisions 
based on an ordering of all alternatives and then base our choice in a rational manner 
on the alternative(s) that maximize expected utility (see Figure 1). The rational actor 
model is based on three main assumptions, all of which claim universal validity:23 
(1) Order – there are discoverable underlying cause-effect relationships in human 
interactions, the understanding of which in past behavior enables us to define 
‚best practice‛ for the future. 
(2) Rational decisions – our choices are rational results of calculations of expected 
utility based on the desire to maximize pleasure and minimize pain. 
(3) Intentional capability – the mere acquisition of capability indicates automatically 
an intention to use that capability. 
Of course, in real life we do not possess perfect information and cannot base our 
choices on decision strategies reflecting unbounded rationality. Instead, political 
scientist Herbert Simon convincingly demonstrated that people typically possess 
uncertain information about all their potential alternative choices and dispose only of 
                                                          
22 Liedtka & Rosenblum, ‚Teaching Strategy as Design,‛ p. 285; see also Harry Mintzberg, ‚The Rise and 
Fall of Strategic Planning,‛ Harvard Business Review, January-February 1994, pp. 107-114. 
23 For further detail see for instance Cynthia F. Kurtz and David J. Snowden, ‚The New Dynamics of 
Strategy: Sense-making in a complex and complicated World,‛ IBM Systems Journal, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2003. 
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limited computational capacity to determine their maximum utility function. To 
account for those limits of rationality, Simon suggested replacing the aim of maximizing 
an objective function with the more realistic concept of satisficing.  
Satisficing denotes ‚problem solving and decision making that sets an aspiration 
level, searches until an alternative is found that is satisfactory by the aspiration level 
criterion, and selects that alternative.‛24 In other words, individuals create a threshold 
which allows them to demarcate their choices, accepting only alternatives above the 
threshold. Furthermore, ordering is no longer necessary, since individuals may choose 
the first alternative above the threshold, as that meets their requirements (which 
determine the threshold in the first place). But how are these decision thresholds 
determined? What processes enable individuals to satisfice in the first place?   




                                                          
24 Herbert Simon, Models of Bounded Rationality, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1982, p. 168. 
25
 The figure was adopted from Fred W. Nickols, “Strategic Decision Making: Commitment to Strategic Action,” at 
http://home.att.net/~essays/strategic_decision_making.pdf, accessed 04/08/09. A detailed discussion of the rational 
actor model can be found in Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, 2
nd
 ed., New York: Longman, 1999. 
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Decision-Making under Uncertainty 
Psychologists have studied the way individuals make decisions in the presence 
of great uncertainty or incomplete information and have found that they often rely on 
mental shortcuts – called ‚heuristics‛ – to help them ‚reduce the complex tasks of 
assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler judgmental operations.‛26 
Heuristics can be considered ‚rules of thumb,‛ educated guesses, intuitive judgments 
or simply common sense that are learned and honed by experience. More precisely, 
heuristics reflect strategies using readily accessible, though loosely applicable, 
information to control problem-solving.27 Although reliance on heuristics can provide 
effective rational guidance in most circumstances, in certain cases it may lead to 
systematic errors or cognitive biases that, in turn, may skew decision-making and 
undermine operational objectives. 
Heuristics relevant to decision-making under conditions of uncertainty (and with 
relevance to strategic decision-making in VUCA contexts) include:28 
 Anchoring and Adjustment. People start with an implicitly suggested reference 
point (the ‚anchor‛) and adjust their decisions based on that specific data point. 
However, anchoring may result in a focusing effect in that people place too much 
importance on one aspect of an event, thereby causing an error in accurately 
predicting the utility of a future outcome.29 For instance, during Operation 
Restore Hope in Somalia in the early 1990s, some soldiers, confused by 
constantly changing mission objectives, searched for cognitive frames of 
reference to come to terms with their peacekeeping assignment. A number of 
U.S. soldiers, for instance, employed a ‚warrior strategy,‛ generalizing the 
                                                          
26 Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic and Amos Tversky, 1982. Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and 
Biases. Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Sidney: Cambridge University Press, 1982, p. 3. 
27 See, for instance, Judea Pearl. Heuristics: Intelligent Search Strategies for Computer Problem Solving. New 
York: Addison-Wesley, 1983, p. vii. 
28 See Kahneman et al., Judgment under Uncertainty.  
29 For example, Kahneman et al. demonstrated that when asked to guess the percentage of African nations 
which are members of the United Nations, people who were first asked ‚Was it more or less than 45%?‛ 
guessed lower values than those who had been asked if it was more or less than 65%. This pattern held in 
other experiments for a wide variety of different subjects of estimation. See Ibid. 
 
 
JOURNAL OF MILITARY AND STRATEGIC STUDIES 
10 | P a g e  
 
behavior of some local rioters to all Somalis (e.g., stereotyping them as lazy and 
uncivilized) and treating the entire population as potential enemies.30 
 Representativeness. In many situations, an event A is judged more probable than 
an event B whenever A appears more representative than B. For instance, large 
samples are typically judged more representative than small ones, because their 
‚salient features‛ or ‚essential properties‛ are thought to better reflect those of 
the population. In the Somalia experience above, for instance, the idea that 
anyone could be an ‚enemy‛ was reinforced (i.e., made salient) right at the 
beginning of the operation. That handbook handed to Canadian peacekeepers 
prior to deployment stated, ‚always remember, yesterday’s allies can turn on 
non-vigilant groups if it is in their interest and they can get away with it. This is 
an unfortunate aspect of trust-building in Somalia.‛31 Relying on the 
representativeness of an event as an indicator of its probability may either give 
undue influence to variables that affect the representativeness of an event, but 
not its probability, or it may reduce the importance of variables that are crucial to 
determining the event's probability, but are unrelated to the event's 
representativeness.   
 Availability. Psychological experiments have revealed that whenever some aspect 
of the environment is made disproportionately salient or available to the 
perceiver, that aspect is given more weight in causal attribution. In Somalia, the 
‚warrior strategy‛ mentioned above was adopted most readily by white male 
soldiers who served in combat units and who had been ‚trained intensively to 
operate against a foreign enemy and who did not wish to appear vulnerable to 
the Somalis.‛32 As this example illustrates, stereotypes, can function as 
simplifying decision-guides to shape reality, since people are typically 
preoccupied with highly desirable outcomes (e.g. winning the lottery or 
                                                          
30 For further detail see Volker Franke, ‚The Social Identity of Peacekeeping,‛ in Thomas W. Britt and 
Amy B. Adler (eds.), The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Lessons from the Field, Westport, Conn.: Praeger 
Publishers, 2003, pp. 31-51; Laura L. Miller and Charles Moskos, ‚Humanitarians or Warriors? Race, 
Gender, and Combat Status in Operation Restore Hope,‛ Armed Forces & Society 21, pp. 615-637. 
31 Quoted in Donna Winslow, The Canadian Airborne Regiment in Somalia: A Socio-Cultural Inquiry, Ottawa: 
Canadian Government Publishing, 1997, p. 246. See also, Franke, ‚The Social Identity of Peacekeeping.‛ 
32 Miller & Moskos, ‚Humanitarians or Warriors?‛ p. 633. 
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bolstering their favored self-conception), or with highly undesirable outcomes 
(e.g. an airplane crash or avoiding an unfavorable self-conception). Kahneman et 
al. found confirming evidence of a selective observation bias: people tend to 
perceive support for their initial beliefs, even if the evidence at hand disconfirms 
these beliefs.  
 Affect. Under conditions of uncertainty, feelings such as fear or pleasure may 
solicit an emotional response to the contextual stimulus. Affect enables us to 
make quick decisions and helps us avoid dangerous situations. However, our 
use of emotions to make decisions can also easily cloud judgment. For instance, 
in cases when an emotional reaction like fear is especially strong, it can 
completely overwhelm our reasoning process. Fear, Al Gore has argued, is the 
most powerful enemy of reason, citing the fact that almost three-quarters of all 
Americans were so easily led to believe that Saddam Hussein was personally 
responsible for the attacks of September 11, 2001, and that many Americans still 
believe that most of the hijackers on September 11 were Iraqis.33Already nearly 
200 years ago, Carl von Clausewitz warned: ‚We must firmly believe in the 
superior authority of well-tried maxims, and under the dazzling influence of 
momentary events not forget that their value is of an inferior stamp.‛34  
Strategic decision-making in today’s complex security environment requires 
operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty and rapid change. The role of the 
strategist ‚is to exercise influence over the volatility, manage the uncertainty, simplify 
the complexity, and resolve the ambiguity, all in terms favorable to the interests of the 
state and in compliance with policy guidance.‛35 In the absence of easily transferable 
prior experiences, applicable standard operating procedures, clearly defined rules of 
engagement, or rational decision calculi, decision-makers will need to rely more or less 
heavily on heuristic decision-rules. Any curriculum intended to teach strategy and 
strategic decision-making should not only account for these cognitive short-cuts, it 
ought to focus on developing those skills that enhance individuals’ ability to quickly 
recall and employ desired heuristic decision patterns. Developing this type of non-
                                                          
33 Al Gore, The Assault on Reason, New York: Penguin Press, 2007. 
34 Carl von Clausewitz, On War, LeVergne, TN: Wildside Press, 2009, p. 42. 
35 Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century,‛ p. 18. 
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linear strategic rationality, where ‚the strategic actor is a rationally conscious agent 
cognizant of the local context and the specific situation with all their social and cultural 
conventions,‛ is at the heart of preparing military leaders for the strategic complexities 
of the post-9/11 environment.36 
 
Making Sense of Complexity   
Strategic decision-making in complex environments requires teaching meta-
cognitive skills that provide leaders with a ‚tool-bag‛ of decision-options to use when 
confronting novel situations. This also requires the development of innovative and 
adaptable decision models beyond the linear thinking underlying the rational actor 
model that has characterized traditional strategic decision-making (see Figure 1). The 
rational actor model encourages/teaches individuals ‚to frame problems, formulate 
alternatives, collect data, and then evaluate options.‛37 But the strategic context of 
complex environments demands creative and flexible decision-making not limited only 
to the rational application of predetermined rules and learned response patterns. 
 Strategic decision-making in the future must be proactive and decentralized. 
Experience alone no longer adequately prepares leaders to be effective strategic 
decision-makers, as situational awareness, cross-cultural considerations (in terms of 
organizational as well as international cultures), and trustworthiness are central skills to 
be applied to rapidly changing and increasingly complex decision contexts.  
One example may illustrate the limitations of the rational actor model for 
strategic decision-making under complexity: In 1995, Lt. Gen. Van Riper took a group of 
Marines to the New York Mercantile Exchange, ‚because the jostling, confusing pits 
reminded him of war rooms during combat. First the Marines tried their hand at 
trading on simulators, and to no one’s surprise, the professionals on the floor wiped 
                                                          
36 Ernest R. Alexander, ‚Rationality Revisited: Planning Paradigms in a Post-Postmodernist Perspective,‛ 
Journal of Planning Education and Research, Vol. 19, 2000, p. 246. 
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them out. A month or so later, the traders went to the Corps’s base in Quantico, Va., 
where they played war games against the Marines on a mock battlefield. The traders 
trounced them again – and this time everyone was surprised.‛38 Analyzing the 
humbling results, the Marines concluded that ‚the traders were simply better gut 
thinkers<.They were far more willing to act decisively on the kind of imperfect and 
contradictory information that is all you ever get in war.‛39 The traders, so Kurtz and 
Snowden, ‚were skilled at spotting patterns and intervening to structure those patterns 
in their favor.‛40 
Order and Un-Order: 
If gut instinct relies on pattern recognition, then these sorts of intuitive skills can 
be honed through practice. Given the value of heuristic shortcuts as decision-guides in 
contexts characterized by uncertainty and risk, training that anchors decisions and 
makes salient/available desired response patterns can contribute to preparing military 
leaders for making decisions more quickly and effectively under VUCA conditions. 
However, as the Marine-trader example illustrates, complex decision contexts do not 
always lend themselves to patterned behavior, predetermined choices, or predictable 
outcomes. Ordered contexts allow us to rely on pre-established patterns focusing on 
efficiency in problem solving. In ‚un-ordered‛ contexts, ‚any act changes the nature of 
the system.‛41 Clausewitz refers to this phenomenon as ‚friction.‛ Van Riper explains: 
You have the element of friction on the battlefield, for example. You can’t 
account for friction. It just occurs. It’s everything from a fuel tank that 
leaks and causes an airplane or a vehicle not to be able to perform its 
function, to an accidental discharge that a young soldier makes, to 
weather conditions. All of these have an interplay that causes the friction 
that leads to uncertainty.42 
                                                          
38 Ibid., p. 2. 
39 Ibid., p. 2. 
40 Kurtz and Snowden, ‚The New Dynamics of Strategy,‛ p. 466. 
41 Ibid., p. 466. In contrast to directed or designed order, Kurtz and Snowden refer to ‚emergent orders‛ 
as un-orders which does not depict a lack of order but rather a substantively different kind of order. 
42 PBS Interview, at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/wartech/nature.html, accessed 05/22/11. 
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Kurtz and Snowden illustrate this kind of un-order by comparing it to the 
evolution of cities, in that ‚the two primary versions of urban arrangements, the 
planned and the ‘organic,’ often exist side-by-side<‛43 In complex decision contexts, 
formal command structures and standard operating procedures tend to be 
complemented by informal trust networks and organizational adaptation and 
evolution. And in some circumstances, ‚‘cultural factors,’ ‘inspired leadership,’ ‘gut 
feel,’ and other complex factors are dominant.‛44 
Recognizing the complexities of strategic decision contexts, Kurtz and Snowden 
developed a sense-making framework that captures the nature of a range of strategic 
decision-situations.45 Their Cynefin framework suggests four basic approaches to 
strategic decision-making, depending on the level of contextual uncertainty (see Figure 
2): 
(1) Known (ordered): cause and effect relationships are generally linear, empirical 
and non-disputable; repeatability generates predictive models; focus is on 
efficiency and single-point forecasting, field manuals, operational procedures are 
legitimate and effective; structured techniques are mandatory. 
(2) Knowable (ordered): stable cause and effect relationships exist but may not be 
fully known; at issue is whether time and resources allow a move from knowable 
to known; decision model senses and analyzes incoming data and responds 
accordingly; structured techniques are desirable, but assumptions must be open 
to challenge; entrained patterns are most dangerous since simple error in 
assumptions may lead to false conclusion. 
                                                          
43 ‚Most historic towns, and virtually all those of metropolitan size, are puzzles of premeditated and 
spontaneous, segments, variously interlocked or juxtaposed.‛ Quoted in Kurtz and Snowden, ‚The New 
Dynamics of Strategy,‛ p. 466. 
44 Ibid., p. 466. 
45 Kurtz and Snowden explain: ‚The name Cynefin is a Welsh word whose literal translation into English 
as habitat or place fails to do it justice. It is more properly understood as the place of our multiple 
affiliations, the sense that we all, individually and collectively, have many roots, cultural, religious, 
geographic, tribal, and so forth. We can never be fully aware of the nature of those affiliations, but they 
profoundly influence what we are. The name seeks to remind us that all human interactions are strongly 
influenced and frequently determined by the patterns of our multiple experiences, both through the 
direct influence of personal experience and through collective experience expressed as stories.‛ Ibid., p. 
467. 
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(3) Complex (un-ordered): studies how patterns emerge through interaction of 
different agents; emergent patterns can be perceived but not necessarily 
predicted (‚retrospective coherence‛); decision model creates probes to make 
patterns of potential patterns more visible prior to taking action; understanding 
requires gaining multiple perspectives on the situation. 
(4) Chaos (un-ordered): no visible/perceivable cause-effect relationships; little to no 
response time; patterned responses may contribute to the chaos; decision-model 
requires quick and decisive action to reduce the turbulence and then sense 
immediately the reaction to the intervention and respond accordingly. 
Figure 2: The Cynefin Framework46 
 
Similar to Kurz and Snowden, Papparone et al. also challenge the applicability of 
linear, hierarchical strategic leadership for effective decision-making under conditions 
of complexity and uncertainty. Instead, they suggest considering the military a complex 
adaptive system (CAS) based on relationship building, sense-making, learning, 
improvising and emergent thinking. ‚Members of the CAS operate under a set of rules 
that changes over time as they gain experience through encounters with the 
environment and each other. As members interact and their roles evolve, order merges 
                                                          
46 Ibid., p. 468. See also Nickols, ‚Strategic Decision Making.‛ 
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and patterns of behavior become evident.‛47 Papparone et al. distinguish a number of 
different leadership tasks for complex adaptive systems that promote innovative 
strategic thinking: 
(1) Relationship building. Whereas traditional bureaucratic approaches have 
treated organizations as collections of roles and focused on role 
management, CAS leaders promote and assist in building longer-term 
relationships that enhance operational effectiveness in the field.  
(2) Loose coupling. Micro-management and over-supervision can lead to 
suboptimal performance. Instead of one-stop solutions, decision-making 
in VUCA environments benefits from parallel searches for diverse 
solutions and their adaptive consideration as decision factors. 
(3) Sense-making. Deriving as a shared understanding of the organizational 
purpose and one’s place therein, members can begin to create shared 
meaning which, in turn, can serve as a normative and heuristic decision-
guide. 
(4) Learning. Adaptive organizations are learning organizations that create 
opportunities for knowledge sharing and norm creation. 
(5) Improvising. ‚Improvisation is a necessary condition when the unfolding 
of the world is full of VUCA and the organization must have the capacity 
to respond to unanticipated circumstances< As in a jazz band, 
improvisation happens when individuals play off the strengths of the 
others.‛48 
(6) Emergent thinking. Under VUCA conditions, forecasting and formal 
planning is less than useful. Instead, thinking about the future in new 
ways is called for. Developing skills at bricolage, ‚the ability to create what 
is needed at the moment out of whatever materials are at hand‛ creates a 
climate or shapes a culture ‚in which people think about what they can do 
                                                          
47 Papperone, Anderson & McDaniel, ‚Where Military Professionalism meets Complexity Science,‛ p. 439. 
48 Ibid., p. 444. 
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with what they have rather than what they might do if they only had 
something else.‛49  
The greatest benefit of the sense-making frameworks lie undoubtedly in the fact 
that they enable decision-makers to move beyond the linear, hierarchical and rational 
decision models designed for success in more or less well-ordered strategic 
environments. The primary challenge in applying a non-linear framework to complex 
and uncertain decision contexts will be to teach strategic decision-makers – or teach 
them to discover – recognizable patterns (although their details may remain 
unpredictable), ‚stabilize or disrupt them depending on their desirability, and seed 
desirable patterns by creating attraction points.‛50 After all, in complex and chaotic 
contexts, even recognizing what we don’t know, might help us search for patterns and 
respond to them. Using case studies and strategic planning exercises can aid this 
process and sharpen the cognitive skills to make sense of complex or chaotic decision 
contexts. 
 
Enter Case Studies 
When the Harvard Business School was started, it became apparent almost 
instantaneously that there were no textbooks suitable to graduate studies in business. 
Faculty members quickly set out to remedy this shortcoming by interviewing leading 
business people and writing detailed accounts of what they were doing. Of course, 
these first case studies could not yet reflect practices to be emulated, because there had 
not been any established criteria for determining success, effectiveness or lessons 
learned. So the professors instructed their students to read the cases, to come to class 
prepared to discuss them and to offer recommendations for appropriate courses of 
action. The case study method was born.51 
                                                          
49 Ibid., p. 445. 
50 Kurtz and Snowden, ‚The new Dynamics of Strategy,‛ p. 481. 
51 The Harvard Business School began using case studies in its instruction in 1925. Detailed information 
on the program can be found at http://harvardbusinessonline.hbsp.harvard.edu/hbsp/case_studies.jsp, 
accessed 05/22/11. For case studies specifically related to U.S. national security issues see also the 
National Security Studies program at Syracuse University’s Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public 
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Cases and exercises used to teach decision-making differ markedly from event-
based traditional historical case studies, in that they place students at the center of 
difficult decisions, force them to wrestle with the complexities, ambiguities and 
uncertainties confronted by the real or fictional decision-makers, and illustrate to them 
how theory can be useful in addressing real world policy/decision dilemmas. More 
specifically, decision cases compel students to: 
 distinguish pertinent from peripheral information, 
 identify problems, dilemmas, decision parameters and alternative courses of 
action, 
 determine possible solutions, 
 formulate strategies and policy recommendations, and 
 recognize and confront obstacles to their implementation.52 
Cases can be historical or retrospective, fictional or decision-forcing. 
Retrospective cases present a comprehensive account of a problem in history, specifying 
the actors involved with a particular focus on their positions and contending interests, 
the cycle of events, and the real outcome. Students are typically asked to analyze why 
certain decisions were taken and the observed result(s) obtained and identify 
alternative options that may have lead to a different outcome.   
Decision-forcing cases stop short of revealing the actual outcome. Instead, they 
force students to get inside the heads of the decision-makers – or the story’s 
protagonist(s) and antagonist(s) –, wrestle with their decision choices and assess the 
utility of possible options for action. Decision-forcing cases may include an ‚epilogue‛ 
that tells ‚the rest of the story,‛ i.e., what happened after the decision point with which 
the case leaves the reader. Students, again, analyze why what happened happened and, 
in doing so, begin to discover and develop common cognitive patterns. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Affairs at http://www.maxwell.syr.edu/exed/sites/nss/Overview_of_NSS_Case_Studies/, accessed 
05/22/11. 
52 Detailed information on the case methodology and its use in the classroom can be found in Golich et al., 
‚The ABCs of Case Teaching.‛ 
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Effective decision cases do not provide specific policy recommendations or 
definite answers for how to resolve the presented dilemmas. Quite the contrary, they 
present evidence in support of both (or more) sides of a policy argument and will often 
leave readers with some discomfort in terms of how dilemmas should be resolved. The 
purpose of using case studies in the classroom is to engage students in active learning 
and enable them to recognize the importance of the issues at hand as well as their 
greater policy implications. In relating each case to other course materials, discussions 
or educational or professional experiences, students begin to discern lessons that apply 
to the broader strategic context and help them establish cognitive patterns for how 
problems could be avoided, challenges met and dilemmas solved in similar 
circumstances in the future. The more leaders are able to develop heuristic shortcuts 
that make desirable, effective response patterns salient, the better prepared they will be 
to effectively navigate the complexities of today’s strategic environment. Case studies 
can play a central role in honing those skills. 
 
Conclusion: Teaching Strategy Using Cases 
Apart from the traditional use of case studies – namely providing a pedagogical 
tool for illustrating dilemmas and have students wrestle with their solution – I argue in 
this article for the use of the case method for honing cognitive decision-making skills 
based on pattern recognition and the development of effective heuristic shortcuts that 
enhance the ability of strategic leaders to operate effectively under conditions of 
ambiguity, uncertainty and risk. The use of case studies and decision exercises has 
proven a valuable tool for teaching the known and analyzing the knowable. Yet, 
applying rigid, linear, rational actor-type decision rules under conditions of great 
uncertainty will likely render suboptimal results. Instead, strategic decision-making in 
complex operations will call on individuals to rely on a combination of experience, skill, 
speed, creativity, adaptability, and intuition. No two situations are exactly alike. To 
make sense of novel situations, we rely on mental shortcuts established through 
previous experiences. Continuous exposure to new situations – real or simulated – will 
hone important heuristic skills.  
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Conceiving of the classroom as a learning laboratory where we attempt to 
approximate complex realities using case studies and decision exercises promotes social 
interaction, relationship building, coordinated planning, shared sense-making and 
intuitive thinking. In doing so, we supply not only the simulated decision context but 
also – oftentimes unintended – assist in creating heuristic frames within which dilemma 
solutions may be derived. The specific course content – topics, readings, prior 
discussions, etc. – increases the salience of certain issues (availability bias), thereby 
providing an indirect frame steering the discussion and solutions in a particular 
direction.53 Unfortunately, the complexities of the contemporary strategic environment 
cannot be addressed by a (or a few) class(es). Strategic decision-making does not 
happen in 90-minute sessions on Tuesdays and Thursdays.  
Instead of teaching strategy in one or a series of dedicated classes, professional 
military education curricula ought to be interfused with diverse and challenging 
strategic decision-choices. In addition to learning how the military develops strategy 
and derives at strategic decisions (using the rational actor model), the curriculum ought 
to also stimulate non-linear reasoning and intuitive skills, through learning to 
recognize/perceive emergent patterns, respond to them and quickly assess, and if 
necessary correct, the appropriate course(s) of action. Using case studies – and 
simulation exercises – frequently will help hone these skills. Adopting case studies on 
non-military topics illustrating dilemmas with little or no connection to national 
security – e.g., management, trade, development, public policy or business related cases 
– will force students to step out of their professional comfort zone and challenge them 
to move away from predetermined thresholds, look for emerging patterns, and reflect 
on the implications of alternative decision choices.  
Teaching strategy effectively means stimulating students continuously to ‚get 
inside the heads‛ of case protagonists with widely differing cultural backgrounds, 
professional experiences, individual and organizational interests – e.g., by identifying 
with the contextual demands placed on different government agencies, foreign leaders, 
NGO representatives, rebel force commanders, civic leaders. In addition, selecting case 
                                                          
53 For instance, in my Introduction to Political Science course, I assign William Golding’s Lord of the Flies. 
Most students have read this book in English class in high school. In my class, however, the reading of 
the book is preceded by readings by Aristotle, Hobbes and Marx. The entire frame with which students 
read or reread a well-known story changes to reflections about governance and human nature. 
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studies that expose students repeatedly to uncertainty and un-order will effectively 
challenge them to choose between ‚allowing the entrained patterns of past experience 
to facilitate fast and effective pattern application and gaining a new perspective because 
the old patterns may no longer apply.‛54 
Strategy in the traditional sense is about control: control over means and ends 
and over the resources to achieve them. In the military, strategy has been aimed at 
controlling VUCA. But our inherent desire for control fails in decision contexts 
characterized by uncertainty and great complexity. Teaching strategy under conditions 
of complexity means fostering and encouraging continuous learning and innovation by 
internalizing a process of sense-making through pattern recognition and instinctive, 
adaptive responses. Consequently, teaching strategy must be more than simply training 
decision-makers in the science of calculating ‚objectives, concepts, and resources within 
acceptable bounds of risk to create more favorable outcomes than might otherwise exist 
by chance or at the hands of others.‛55 It must also be about the art of understanding 
complexity and recognizing the value and interaction of order and un-order. Teaching 
strategy is about effectively using heuristic decision devices to make sense of new 
situations and recognize the possibilities for shaping them in a desired direction. This 
means, honing the skills necessary for making sense of chaos, including the recall of 
heuristics that worked well in the past. Exactly herein lies the central benefit of the case 
method for teaching strategy and strategic decision-making and for preparing 




                                                          
54 Kurtz and Snowden, ‚The new Dynamics of Strategy,‛ p. 467. 
55 Yarger, Strategic Theory for the 21st Century, p. 1. 
